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INTRODUCTION
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prevents
Congress from passing laws that prohibit the free exercise of
religion.' In 1963, the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner' held that
a state cannot substantially burden the free exercise of religion unless
the government offers a compelling state interest3 and uses the least
restrictive means to advance this interest.4 Although past decisions
applied the two-part "compelling interest test" to a number of free
exercise claims,5 the Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division v.
Smith6 distinguished those prior cases7 and held that the Free
Exercise Clause did not require application of the test to claims
challenging otherwise neutral and generally applicable laws.'
In response to the Smith decision, Congress enacted the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),9 a statutory alternative to
free exercise claims, in order to "restore" the compelling interest test
to free exercise jurisprudence.' °
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the free exercise
[of religion] ... ."); see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,303 (1940) (holding that Free
Exercise Clause applies to state and local governments through Fourteenth Amendment).
2. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
3. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,406 (1963) (holding that unemployment law must be
justified by compelling state interest if law substantially infringes on free exercise of religion).
4. i& at 407 (holding that government has burden of showing that "no alternative forms
of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights").
5. See, e.g., Hobbiev. UnemploymentAppeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136,141(1987) (applying
strict scrutiny to determine validity of unemployment compensation law that denied employee
benefits for refusing to work on Sabbath); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (holding that state must show that denial of benefits to employee, who
refused to manufacture weapons based on religious beliefs, furthers some compelling state
interest and is least restrictive means); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (requiring
government to offer interest of"sufficient magnitude" to override free exercise claim of Amish
parents to raise children according to religious traditions).
6. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
7. See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872-81 (1990) ("The only decisions in
which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable
law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the
Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of
speech and of the press."); see also id. at 883-84 (arguing that past Court decisions applied
compelling interest test only to unemployment laws burdening religion).
8. Id. at 885 (refusing to apply compelling interest test to statutes that required benefit
applicants to provide social security numbers and that regulated military dress).
9. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1993)).
10. See H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Ses. 5-6 (1993) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]
(stating that RFRA responded to Smith decision by creating statutory right requiring application
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Despite disagreement among commentators regarding the utility and
impact of RFRA," the restoration of the compelling interest test was
intended to protect religious liberties from the potential harms of
Smith. Among the "parade of horribles" feared by sponsors and
advocates of RFRA were burdens imposed by neutral and generally
applicable zoning ordinances.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Smith, federal courts
have upheld ordinances excluding a religious congregation from a
commercially zoned area'3 and preventing a church from expanding
its facilities. 4 Viewed as the products of post-Smith free exercise
jurisprudence, these decisions were often cited to muster congressio-
nal support for RFRA. 5 Expressing the overall fear that Smith will
enable governmental regulations to trample on religious freedom,
of compelling interest test to governmental burdens on religion); S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. 7-9 (1993) reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.CAN. 1892, 1897-98 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]
(stating that RFRA responded to Smith by creating statutory prohibition against generally
applicable laws that substantially burden religion unless such laws are least restrictive means of
furthering compelling governmental interest).
11. See, e.g., Rex E. Lee, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Legislative Choice and Judicial
Review, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 73, 73 (advocating passage of RFRA and commenting that it would
"certainly represent an improvement over present state of law"); Leon F. Szeptycki &Jean B.
Arnold, Reliious Freedom Restoration Act 88 EDuc. L REP. (WESr) 907,920-21 (1994) (concluding
that RFRA incorrectly assumed "that the legal clock could be turned smoothly back" to pre-Smith
law); James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic
Assessment; 78 VA. L REv. 1407, 1412 (1992) (characterizing RFRA's attempt to reestablish
compelling interest test as "futile endeavor").
12. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. S14,353 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
(commenting that Smith decision was responsible for church's exclusion from city business
district); 139 CONG. REC. H2360 (daily ed. May 11, 1993) (statement of Rep. Schumer) (citing
church's exclusion from commercially zoned areas as example of Smith's "parade of horribles");
Orrin G. Hatch, "Compelling Interest" isfor Our Benefit WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 11, 1993, at B5 (citing
exclusion of churches from business district as one of string of post-Smith lower court decisions
"eroding freedom of religion").
13. See Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 472 (8th Cir. 1991)
(finding ordinance excluding churches from central commercial and industrial area as valid
time, place, and manner restriction).
14. SeeSt. Bartholomew's Church v. City of NewYork, 914F.2d 348, 355-56 (2d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991). St. Bartholomew's involved a free exercise challenge to New
York's Landmark Preservation Laws. Although landmark laws and zoning ordinances are distinct
methods of regulation, both impose restrictions on property and regulate the use of land.
Therefore, the decision in St. Bartholomew's offers helpful insight into the conflict between
zoning and religious interests. See id. at 355 (stating that zoning and landmark regulation are
analogous).
15. See supra note 12 (discussing concerns of RFRA proponents about negative impact of
neutral zoning ordinances); Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before
the Subcomra. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. 13 [hereinafter 1991 HouseHearings] (statement ofRobert P. Dugan, Dir. ofPublic Affairs,
National Association of Evangelicals) (observing that Smith holding forces churches to obtain
permission to relocate.altars); SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 14 n.43, reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.CA.N. 1892, 1903-04; see also Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An
Interpretative Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VaL. L. REV. 1, 55 (1994) (observing
that Act's sponsors "often stated that RFRAwould restore protection to churches that had been
restricted in using their property by draconian rules on zoning or historic preservation").
202 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:199
Representative Maloney stated, "[M]y constituents are quite con-
cerned about the unwarranted governmental interference with
religious practice .... Congregations of different religions have
already run afoul of zoning regulations which have banned houses of
worship in particular neighborhoods." 6 The legislative history and
judicial background suggest that RFRA was motivated, in part, by
concerns over zoning regulations that interfere with religious
freedom.
1 7
Because RFRA enables free exercise claimants to circumvent the
decision in Smith by providing an independent statutory claim or
defense, i" the Act adds new hope for individuals and organizations
whose religious interests are burdened by generally applicable zoning
ordinances, but were left with few remedies after Smith.19 In fact,
research by the Baptist Joint Committee, a coalition of Baptist
organizations, found that approximately half of all Free Exercise
16. 139 CONG. REc. H2363 (daily ed. May 11, 1993) (statement of Rep. Maloney).
17. See Berg, supra note 15, at 17-18 (commenting that one goal of RFRA was to alleviate
impact of land use regulations upon religious liberties).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (stating that purpose of chapter is "to
provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by
government").
19. Compare First Assembly of God v. Collier County, 20 F.3d 419, 423 (applying Smith to
uphold zoning prohibition of church-located homeless shelter), modified, 27 F.3d 526 (1 1th Cir.
1994) with Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538, 546
(D.D.C. 1994) (applying RFRA to allow church to operate homeless shelter in residentially
zoned area without requisite permit); see also Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act; 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 883,894-95 (1994) [hereinafter Laycock, FreeExercise]
(discussing how post-Smith jurisprudence reduced merits of free exercise claims challenging
zoning ordinances); Sam Roberts, Fight City Hall? Nope, Not Even Mother Teresa, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
17, 1990, at BI (providing account of unlitigated closing of homeless shelter).
Comparing the Eleventh Circuit's decision in First Assembly of God with the district court's
decision in Western Presbyterian Church is helpful, but it does not lead to a dispositive
determination that RFRA will change the outcome of zoning cases decided under a Smith
analysis. Although both cases involved zoning regulations that prohibited the operation of
homeless shelters on church property, factual differences may distinguish the holdings. For
example, the community in First Assembly of God offered evidence that "homeless people had
taken up residence in vacant lots, where the living conditions were unsanitary." First Assemb
of God, 20 F.3d at 420. The court attributed this problem in part to the church's homeless
shelter. Id. In Western Presbyterian, there existed no evidence showing that the shelter created
a nuisance to the surrounding community. See Western Presbyterian, 862 F. Supp. at 546
(commenting that shelter should be allowed to operate absent proof of nuisance). Also, the
zoning board in Western Pesbyterian Church conceded that it did not have a compelling state
interest in prohibiting the operation of the homeless shelter. Id. at 545. This concession may
have weakened the government's case significantly. See infra notes 79,86 and accompanying text
(describing court's growing deference to government's interest in religious disputes); see also
Christian Gospel Church v. City and County of San Francisco, 896 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir.
1990) (holding that city had "strong interest in the maintenance of the integrity of its zoning
scheme and the protection of its residential neighborhoods"), cert. denie4 498 U.S. 999 (1990).
Moreover, while the court in First Assembly based its holding on Smith and declined to discuss the
applicability of RFRA, the court supported its decision by applying a test that was based on
pre-Smith free exercisejurisprudence. See First Assembly, 20 F.3d at 423-24 (applying balancing
test from Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983)).
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claims litigated after RFRA's enactment and at the time of the study
were decided in favor of religious liberty.2" Combined with the
criticisms levied against cases favoring land use regulations over
religious freedom, 21 it comes as no surprise that religious organiza-
tions have filed claims under RFRA in a renewed effort to challenge
zoning regulations affecting religious interests.22
This Comment argues that RFRA will not necessarily provide
greater religious protection against zoning ordinances than post-Smith
free exercise jurisprudence. Although Congress drafted RFRA to
mitigate the possible adverse consequences of Smith, the Act does not
adequately solve the problems of individuals and religious organiza-
tions who find themselves burdened by generally applicable zoning
laws. Part I of this Comment provides an overview of zoning and Free
Exercise Clause jurisprudence. Part II analyzes whether RFRA will be
effective in solving the problems that religious organizations and
individuals often encounter when challenging zoning ordinances
under the Free Exercise Clause. Part III discusses possible exceptions
to the holding in Smith in an attempt to determine whether RFRA's
reinstatement of the compelling interest test represents a significant
improvement over the Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause as enunciated in Smith. Finally, Part IV addresses the statutory
shortcomings of RFRA and suggests improvements in order to strike
a proper balance between zoning and religious interests.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: ZONING AND FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
A. Zoning
Local governments have long imposed regulations on the use and
development of land, particularly as a result of the urbanization of
America and the accompanying economic and social problems.23 In
20. See Religious-Freedom Law Marks First Anniversary, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Jan. 4, 1995, at 7
(finding that about half of 28 cases decided after RFRA's enactment resulted in favor of religious
interests).
21. See supra notes 13, 15 and accompanying text (criticizing judicial opinions preferring
land use restrictions over religious freedom).
22. See Germantown Seventh Day Adventist Church v. City of Philadelphia, No. 94-1633,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12163, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1994) (amending complaint to include
RFRA claim in order to challenge validity of ordinance prohibiting expansion of facilities);
Celestial Church of Christ, Inc. v. City of Chicago, No. 93 C 7610, 1994 WL 282304, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. June 22, 1994) (including RFRA claim to enjoin prior circuit court's decision excluding
church from commercially zoned area).
23. SeeVillage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388-87 (1926) (observing need
for land use regulations created by developments in technology and urban communities).
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Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,24 the Supreme Court held that
land use regulation was a valid exercise of a state's police power.'
Zoning enabled the state to preserve and protect the public wel-
fare.26
In defining the public welfare, courts have generally provided wide
discretion to states tojustify their zoning schemes." The police power
is not limited to the elimination of public nuisances. As the Court
stated in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,28 police power is "not confined
to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay
out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet
seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people."2"
States may use their powers to preserve the spiritual and aesthetic
integrity of neighborhoods."0 For example, a city may impose zoning
regulations on adult establishments to prevent the "deleterious"
effects associated with such uses.
3'
Because traditional police powers include the ability to create and
enforce zoning regulations, a state's exercise of these powers will be
held constitutional unless it appears arbitrary and unreasonable and
bears no substantial relation to the health, safety, morals or general
welfare of the state. 2 If the state's purpose and zoning classification
are "fairly debatable," 3 the courts must grant deference to the state
24. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
25. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); see also 1 ROBERT M.
ANDERSON, AMERICAN ]LAW OF ZONING § 3.09, at 93 (2d ed, 1976) (commenting that Euclid
"firmly established" that comprehensive zoningwas constitutional exercise of state police power).
The Tenth Amendment states that "powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONSr. amend. X. This amendment grants to the states what is typically referred
to as "police power."
26. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387 (justifying act of zoning as necessary for preservation of public
welfare).
27. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 4 (1974) (stating that legislative
judgment must control if zoning scheme's purpose is fairly debatable); Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187 (1928) (holding that decision of government officials will be
invalidated only upon showing of arbitrary or irrational exercise of power); Euclid, 272 U.S. at
387 (stating that validity of zoning ordinance varies with circumstances and conditions).
28. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
29. Village of Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (legitimizing use of police power
for purpose of restricting land use to "one-family dwellings").
30. Id at 6 (delineating permissible use of police power to include regulation of
community's beauty, health, expanse, cleanliness, balance, and security).
31. SeeYoung v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 74-75 (1976) (holding that
ordinance restricting location of adult movie theaters advanced public welfare).
32. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928) (setting forth criteria for
constitutional use of police power); Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395 (stating that provisions of ordinance
will not be scrutinized "sentence by sentence" where broad prohibitions of ordinance were
generally opposed).
33. Boraas, 416 U.S. at 4.
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legislature's decision.' 4 When zoning regulations conflict with
personal and fundamental rights, however, this judicial deference to
a state's zoning scheme does not apply.35
In Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,6 the Supreme Court held
that the state's attempt to regulate live entertainment in commercially
zoned areas must be exercised within the boundaries of the Constitu-
tion." In particular, the Court stated that the standard of review
depends on the nature of the rights threatened rather than the power
being exercised by the government.' Because the zoning law
infringed on the First Amendment right to free speech,39 the Court
applied a First Amendment analysis, holding that the ordinance must
be "narrowly drawn and must further a sufficiently substantial
government interest" in order to be valid.' Applying this rationale,
a zoning ordinance that threatens religious exercise must conform
with constitutional principles.41 Because the nature of the threat-
ened right determines the validity of state action in zoning cases
involving an infringement on the right to the free exercise of religion,
the courts should generally apply the relevant standard of review
mandated by the Free Exercise Clause.42
34. It. at 8 (holding that legislature's definition of family for zoning purposes need only
bear "a rational relationship to a [permissible] state objective"); see also Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395
(holding that reasonableness of zoning ordinance precluded judicial determination of
unconstitutionality). But see Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188 (holding zoning plan invalid because it did
not substantially relate to health, safety, moral, or general welfare of public).
35. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (stating that ordinance's
definition of family, which included all those "related by blood, adoption, or marriage," had
intrusive effect on familial relationship and did not deserve usual judicial deference toward
legislative judgment). Justice Brennan's concurrence, joined by Justice Marshall, provided a
sharp critique of the ordinance's restrictive definition offamily by stating that "the zoning power
is not a license for local communities to enact senseless and arbitrary restrictions which cut
deeply into private areas of protected family life." I at 507 (Brennan,J., concurring). But see
Boraas, 416 U.S. at 8 (stating that ordinance limiting one-family dwellings to not more than two
unrelated persons is exercise of legislative, not judicial function).
36. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
37. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981) (setting outer limits of
local government's zoning powers).
38. Id. at 68; see also Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387 (stating that "degree of elasticity" afforded
zoning regulations depends on application of constitutional principles).
39. See Schad, 452 U.S. at 66 (holding that nude dancing fhis within First Amendment
protections).
40. I at 68; cf Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (stating that
Court must "examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the
extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation" when government intrudes on
personal choices protected by Due Process Clause); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S.
1, 7 (1974) (applying rational basis test to occupancy requirement because no fundamental right
was implicated); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928) (holding that
regulations affecting general property rights are subject to rational basis test).
41. See Schad, 452 U.S. at 68 (drawing constitutional boundaries for zoning regulations).
42. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2226-29
(1993) (applying compelling interest test because land use ordinance and animal cruelty law
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B. The Free Exercise Clause
Unlike zoning, the concept and role of religion in America can be
traced to the birth of this nation.4' Therefore, it is not surprising
that the Founders, in creating the Bill of Rights, included the Free
Exercise Clause.' Although the Free Exercise Clause has been in
effect since 1791, the degree of protection and the proper function
of the Free Exercise Clause continues to be a source of debate among
modern-day scholars.45
1. The rise of the compelling interest test
Prior to the middle of the twentieth century, the Free Exercise
Clause was not a major independent source of protection for religious
conduct against governmental interference." During this period,
impermissibly targeted religious practice); Islamic Ctr. v. City of Starkville, 840 F.2d 293, 299
(5th Cir. 1988) (applying compelling interest test because ordinance impermissibly burdened
religion by excluding mosque from city limits); cf. Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of
Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538, 544-45 (D.D.C. 1994) (applying RFRA's compelling
interest test to determine validity of zoning ordinance prohibiting operation of homeless shelter
on church property). But see Ann L. Wehener, Men a House is Not a Home But a Church: A
Proposalfor Protection of Home Worship from Zoning Ordinances, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 491,494 (1993)
(commenting that lower courts, in deciding religious zoning issues, tend to focus on Due
Process Clause rather than Free Exercise Clause analysis).
43. See Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration AcA 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 221, 222
[hereinafter Laycock, ReligiousFreedom] ("[T]he founding generation of Americans had a vision
of society in which religion would be entirely voluntary and entirely free. People of all faiths
and of none would be welcome."). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized the religious
tradition in America and its influence on the formation of our system of government. See
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 303, 313 (1952) ("We are a religious people whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being.").
44. U.S. CONST. amend. L The First Amendment contains two religion clauses-the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. Although both clauses limit the degree of
interaction between Church and State, the Free Exercise Clause has a "reach of its own" in
protecting religious freedom from government interference. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437, 461 (1971) (addressing broader ambit of Free Exercise clause compared to "general
harmony" of two First Amendment religion clauses).
45. SeeHoward M. Friedman, Rethinking Free Exercise: RediscoveringReligious Community and
Ritua4 24 SETON HALL L REV. 1800, 1801 (1994) (arguing that focus of free exercise debate
should be on religious groups and their autonomy rather than individual rights); Laycock,
Religious Freedom, supra note 43, at 222 (asserting that Founders recognized need to grant
religious exemptions from formally neutral laws as part of right to free exercise of religion);
Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 117, 125-26 (observing
that earlyjudicial decisions rejected mandatory religious exemptions from generally applicable
laws as part of free exercise and that exemptions were granted as part of public policy).
46. SeeJOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1218 (4th ed. 1991)
(commenting that Free Exercise Clause did not give significant independent protection against
police power regulations prior to 1960); Thomas S. Counts, Justice Douglas' Sanctuary: May
Churches Be Excluded from Suburban Residential Areas, 45 OHIO ST. LJ. 1017, 1027 (1984)
(observing that religious rights were often protected on grounds other than Free Exercise
Clause). The first Supreme Court case decided solely on free exercise grounds was Braunfeld
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). In Braunfeld, the Court, applying a rational basis test, held that
a Sunday closing law did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 607.
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the Supreme Court relied on due process or free speech jurispru-
dence rather than the Free Exercise Clause to invalidate governmen-
tal action affecting the exercise of religion.47 In Sherbert v. Verner,48
the Supreme Court introduced the compelling interest test to free
exercise jurisprudence, thereby expanding the possible scope of
religious protection under the Free Exercise Clause.49
In Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist was discharged by her employer
and denied unemployment compensation by the state because she
refused to work on Saturday, a designated holy day for her religion.5
The state found that she did not qualify for unemployment benefits
because she failed to provide a good cause for refusing employ-
ment." The Supreme Court held that the state's action violated
Sherbert's religious liberty guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause. 2
In striking down the state's unemployment policy, the Court held
that the state cannot substantially burden the free exercise of religion
unless a compelling state interest exists as an underlying basis to
justify such regulation. 3 Moreover, the state must demonstrate that
no less restrictive means exist to advance its interests.54 Applying this
two-pronged compelling interest test, the Court determined that the
state's benefit policy burdened Sherbert's ability to practice her
47. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 302 (1940) (holding that distribution of
religious materials was protected by First Amendment right to free speech); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 533 (1925) (holding that statute requiring students to attend only public
schools violated Due Process Clause); see also NOWvAK & ROTuNDA, supra note 46, at 1215-18
(tracing early Supreme Court protection of religious conduct).
48. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
49. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 40304 (1963) (acknowledging that indirect burden
on religious practice may infringe on free exercise of religion to same extent as direct burden);
f. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 612 (1961) (applying rational basis test to free exercise
claim because governmental action indirectly burdened religion). After the Sherbert decision,
the precedential value of Braunfeld appears to be open to debate. SeeJ. Brett Pritchard, Conduct
and Belief in the Free Exercise Clause: Developnents and Deviations in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 268, 281 (1990) (arguing that Court's
failure to explicitly overrule Braunfeld leaves rational basis standard in "suspended animation").
Yet only three justices viewed Sherbert as overruling the Braunfeld direct/indirect burden
distinction. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 417 (Stewart,J., concurring in result) (arguing that Braunfeld
was wrongly decided and should be overruled in light of Court's decision); id. at 421 (Harlan,
White, JJ., dissenting) (stating that Court's decision rejects Braunfeld precedent).
50. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399-400 (1963).
51. Id. at 401.
52. Id. at 410.
53. Id. at 407.
54. Id. at 403. The two-pronged compelling interest test outlined by the Court in Sherbert
is the functional equivalent of strict scrutiny analysis. See Thomas F. LaMacchia, Note, Reverse
Accommodation of Religion, 81 GEO. LJ. 117, 121 (1992) (observing that strict scrutiny has been
applied in other constitutional contexts, such as discriminatory challenges under Equal
Protection Clause and fundamental rights challenges under Due Process Clause).
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religion." The state's purported interest in preventing false unem-
ployment claims by those "feigning religious objections to Saturday
work" was not raised previously at the state court level; therefore, the
Supreme Court declined to assess the importance of this asserted gov-
ernmental interest.56 Moreover, assuming that the state's unemploy-
ment compensation fund suffered from such claims, the Court in
Sherbert held that the government would have to show that "no
alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without
infringing First Amendment rights." 7 Because the state's unemploy-
ment benefits scheme placed an unjustifiable burden on Sherbert's
free exercise rights, the Court declared the statute constitutionally
infirm.58
The Supreme Court's decision in Wisconsin v. Yodei 9 contributed
to the rise of religious freedom under the Free Exercise Clause.'"
In Yoder, the Amish claimants challenged the constitutionality of a
neutral and generally applicable education law that imposed fines and
imprisonment for those who failed to comply.6' The Amish commu-
nity argued that the law, which required school attendance until the
age of sixteen, burdened a fundamental tenet of their religion, and
was thereby unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause.62 The
Supreme Court agreed and held that the state could not compel
attendance by the Amish children.63
In evaluating the state's interest, the Court recognized that the state
could validly impose regulations concerning education.' The Court
held, however, that the state was not "totally free from a balancing
55. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 (inquiring whether disqualification of benefits burdened
Sherbert's free exercise of religion).
56. Id. at 407.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
60. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 46, at 1211 (stating that Yoderrepresents first time
Supreme Court allowed exemption from generally applicable law due to religious beliefs); Ralph
D. Mawdsley, Has Wisconsin v. Yoder Been Reversed? Analysis of Employment Division v. Smith,
63 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 11, 11 (1990) (characterizing Yoder as leading free exercise case in
education field); Jennifer E. Spreng, Comment, Failing Honorably: Balancing Tests, Justice
O'Connor and Free Exercise of Religion, 38 ST. Louis U. LJ. 837, 852-54 (1994) (commenting that
Yoder established "high watermark" of compelling interest test in free exercise jurisprudence).
61. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207-08 (1972).
62. Id. at 213 (explaining respondent's argument against state law requiring children to
attend school until age of 16).
63. Id. at 234 (holding that state law compelling Amish parents to send their children to
formal high school violated respondent's rights).
64. Id. at 213 ("There is n-o doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility
for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of
basic education.").
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process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests"6 5 and
that only those interests of the "highest order"6" would justify a
burden on rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause.67 Because
the compulsory education law unduly burdened Amish religious
practice,' the state had to demonstrate "with particularity" how an
exemption to the Amish would defeat the state's interests.6 9 Because
the government failed to show that an exemption would impede the
interests of promoting democracy and self-reliance through education,
the Court held that the state must exempt the Amish from the
mandatory education law."
The Yoder decision was significant for two reasons. First, it
extended the compelling interest test beyond the unemployment
compensation field." Second, it appeared to add another step to
the Court's Free Exercise Clause analysis as articulated in Sherbert.
Unlike Sherbert, the Yoder decision evaluated whether the burdened
conduct was a sincere expression of religious belief or motivated by
a purely philosophical and personal belief. 2 If the conduct ex-
65. Id. at 214.
66. Id. at 215 (discussing interests of high social importance that would override religious
interests such as invalidations of financial aid to parochial schools).
67. Id. (distilling the "essence" of all writings on separation of church and state in context
of education).
68. See id. at 218 (holding that impact of law on religious practice was "not only severe, but
inescapable").
69. Id. at 236 (citing Sherbertv. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
70. Id.
71. This conclusion does not have universal support. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note
46, at 1225 (discussing Yoderand stating that "[tihe Court did not use the 'compelling interest'
test, thus suggesting the use of a more open balancing test"); Szeptycki & Arnold, supra note 11,
at 909 (noting that Yoderand Sherbert did not set forth same formulation of compelling interest
test). Despite these interpretations, subsequent Supreme Court cases and many commentators
have interpreted Yoder as applying a compelling interest standard. See Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894-95 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (recognizing
Yoderas one of many cases that required "the government to justify any substantial burden on
religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and by means narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest"); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employ. Soc. Div., 450 U.S. 707,718 (1981)
(quoting language from Yoder to determine definition of compelling state interest); see also
Counts, supra note 46, at 1029 (observing that Yoderapplied compelling interest test); Mawdsley,
supra note 60, at 18 (same).
72. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-19 (examining record to determine whether Amish opposition
to education law was matter of "deep religious conviction" or "personal preference"). Some
commentators have viewed Yoder as establishing a three-part test: (1) whether the activity in
question was motivated by and rooted in a legitimate and sincerely held religious belief; (2)
whether the free exercise of that religion is unduly burdened by governmental action; and (3)
whether the state's interests were compelling, justifying the burden on religious practice. See
Counts, supra note 46, at 1029 (interpreting Yoderas establishing three-part test); Mawdsley, supra
note 60, at 18-20 (outlining shifting elements of proof articulated in Yoder).
In Sherbert, the Court declined to inquire into the sincerity of religious conduct or the "truth
or falsity of religious beliefs" because the issue was not raised by the state. 374 U.S. at 407. In
addition, it appeared that the Court was reluctant to engage in such judicial analysis. Writing
for the Court, Justice Brennan commented, "Even if consideration of such evidence is not
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pressed secular values, such conduct would not fall within the
protection of the Free Exercise Clause."3 Evaluating the Amish
community's free exercise claim, Chief Justice Burger stated:
Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious sect
and a long history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of
American society, the Amish in this case have convincingly demon-
strated the sincerity of their religious beliefs, the interrelationship
of belief with their mode of life, the vital role that belief and daily
conduct play in the continued survival of Old Order Amish
communities and their religious organization. 4
The Court realized that determining the sincerity of religious conduct
was a delicate process; however, it was necessary to "preclude[]
allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of
conduct in which society as a whole has important interests."'5 By
examining the religious tenets of the Amish and their role in a
believer's life, the Court determined that the Amish community's
opposition to the state's law was firmly rooted in their religion.7"
2. The fall of the compelling interest test
According to one scholar, both Sherbert and Yoder represent
decisions that "rigorously enforced the compelling interest test.""
Application of the test in subsequent free exercise cases, however, did
not provide significant protection to religious liberty outside the
foreclosed by the prohibition againstjudicial inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs,
... it is highly doubtful whether such evidence would be sufficient to warrant a substantial
infringement of religious liberties." Id. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions suggest that some
religious beliefs do not fall within the protection of the Free Exercise Clause. See Frazee v.
Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989) (granting protection of Free
Exercise Clause where individual did not follow teaching of established religious organization
but held personal religious beliefs (citing Thomas, 450 U.S. at 707)); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715
(suggesting that certain claims are "so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to
be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause"). Neither Thomas nor Fr=z however,
provide conclusive answers as to which religious beliefs qualify for protection. See NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 46, at 1213 (discussing ambiguous realm of what is considered protected
religious belief).
73. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 (premising viability of free exercise claim on existence of
religious beliefs). For a critique of the distinction between religious and secular beliefs, see
AndrewW. Austin, Faith and the ConstitutionalDefinition of Reigion, 22 CUMB. L. REv. 1, 8 (1991-
92) (arguing that religious/secular distinction, as discussed in Yoder, is problematic and has no
basis in First Amendment jurisprudence).
74. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235.
75. IL at 215-16; see NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 46, at 1214 (stating that testing
individual's sincere expression of religious belief does not constitute per se violation of religion
clauses).
76. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216 ("The traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter
of preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and
intimately related to daily living.").
77. Laycock, Reigious Freedom, supra note 43, at 231.
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unemployment context.78 For the most part, the Supreme Court
declined to expand religious protection under the Free Exercise
Clause, progressively narrowing the definition of what constituted a
religious burden while loosening the compelling state interest
requirement of the test.79
For example, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cenwtery Protective Ass'n8°
the Supreme Court held that governmental action did not substantial-
ly burden religion absent direct coercion of individuals to act contrary
to their religious beliefs.8 In Lyng, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully
challenged the federal government's attempt to harvest timber and
build a road through sacred land.82 Although the majority acknowl-
edged that the government's action would "have severe adverse
effects" on the Native Americans' religious practices,83 the Court
declined to apply the compelling interest test because the state's
action did not force the claimants to violate their religious beliefs.84
The Court's strict interpretation of substantial burden led many
commentators to criticize the Lyng decision for departing from
precedent and restricting the scope of free exercise protection.
85
In determining whether a state's interest qualifies as compelling,
the Court, in recent years, also appeared to decrease religious
protection by loosening its interpretation of "compelling" without
explicitly abandoning the Sherbert test. For example, in United States
78. See Kenneth Manin, Note, Employment Division v. Smith: The Supreme Court Alters the
State of FreeExercise Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1431, 1444-45 (1991) (commenting that in recent
years compelling interest test failed to extend constitutional protection to religious liberty);
Ryan, supra note 11, at 1414 (observing that Supreme Court decided against religious liberty
interest in 13 of 17 free exercise claims after Sherbert).
79. See Main, supra note 78, at 1445-46 (commenting that Court shifted balance in favor
of state by "interpreting states' interest broadly and the religious interest narrowly"); Ryan, supra
note 11, at 1414-15 (noting that Court simultaneously relaxed definition of "compelling" and
restricted definition of "burden").
80. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
81. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450 (1988). The
substantial burden test applied in Lyng is also referred to as the "noncoercive" test. GREGG
IVERS, LOWERING THE WALu RELIGION AND THE SUPREME COURT IN THE 1980s, at 79 (1991).
82. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 442.
83. I& at 447.
84. Xd at 450.
85. See, eg., Pritchard, supra note 49, at 292 (commenting that Lyng decision "exhibited
'distressing insensitivity'" to religious liberties (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 493 (Stewart, J.,
concurring))); Alfred J. Sciarrino, The Rehnquist Courts Free Exercise Coll'sion on the Peyote Road,
23 CUMB. L. REV. 315, 329-30 (1993) (viewing Lyngas striking "low point" in Court's modem
history of free exercisejurisprudence); Ellen AdairPage, Note, The Scope of the Free Exercise Clause:
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 68 N.C. L. REV. 410, 421 (1990)
(concluding that Lyn's restrictive test "reeks of injustice"); S. Alan Ray, Comment, Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association: GovemmentProperty and theFreeExercise Claus
16 HASmNcs CONST. L.Q. 483, 511 (1989) (arguing that Court in Lyng ignored past decisions
supporting expansive interpretation of Free Exercise Clause).
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:199
v. Lee, 6 the Court held that mandatory participation in the Social
Security system served a compelling state interest.8 7 Although
exemptions existed for self-employed individuals who opposed paying
taxes based on religious beliefs, the Court declined to extend the
exemptions to employers who opposed payment on identical
grounds.'u The decision in Lee has been criticized for its loose
treatment of the compelling state interest requirement.8 9
Finally, in Employment Division v. Smith, 90 the Court held that a
state may deny unemployment compensation to those dismissed for
violating the state's criminal law against peyote use, even though the
law imposed a substantial burden on the ability of Native Americans
to use the drug for religious ceremonial purposes.9' The Court
concluded that the compelling interest test only applied to a select
type of free exercise claims, and held that neutral laws of general
applicability, such as the criminal law in the instant case, were not
otherwise subject to the test.92 The holding shocked the legal
community9 3 and appeared to be an unprecedented decision in free
exercise jurisprudence.94
86. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
87. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-59 (1982) (describing mandatory participation
in Social Security system as "indispensable").
88. Id. at 260-61.
89. See Marin, supra note 78, at 1446 (arguing that Lee decision started "movement away
from the rigorous protection of religious liberty which characterized the free exercise cases of
the preceding two decades"); Spreng, supra note 60, at 854 (commenting that Lee decision
marked beginning ofjudicial deference to legislative and administrative bodies during 1980s and
1990s). But see Laycock, Religious Freedom, supra note 43, at 231.
Even before Smith, the Court had been criticized for excessive deference to govermmen-
tal agencies in free exercise cases. But most of these deferential decisions were not
decided under the compelling interest test at all, either because the Court found no
burden on religious exercise or because it created exceptions to the compelling
interest test. These cases cast no light on the meaning of the compelling interest test.
Id.
90. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
91. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,890 (1990). Smith involved two unemployment
compensation cases. Initially, the Supreme Court remanded the two cases to the Oregon
Supreme Court to determine whether religious use of the peyote drug violated the state's
criminal law. Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 674 (1988). On remand, the state
supreme court held that Oregon's criminal law applied to the sacramental use of peyote, but
that the prohibition violated the Free Exercise Clause. Smith v. Employment Div., 763 P.2d 146,
149-50 (Or. 1988), rev'4 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
92. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
93. See, eg., Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionay
Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 555, 570 (1991) (observing that Smith decision
"stunned constitutional lawyers and commentators"); Tushnet, supra note 45, at 117
(commenting that Smith decision "outraged" most constitutional scholars); Ryan, supra note 11,
at 1409 (observing that members of media, academics, and religious interest groups reacted with
condemnation and despair).
94. See, e.g., Main, supra note 78, at 1433 (arguing that Smith contradicted "well-established
free exercise precedent"); Susan E. Simoneau, Note, An Anomay: Religious Freedom Protected
Through Political Process Rather Than the First Amendment 13 BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 155, 157 (1992)
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Interpreting the scope of the Free Exercise Clause, the Court stated
that the right to free exercise did not relieve a person from obeying
a "'valid and neutral law of general applicability"' merely because the
law burdens religious conduct. 5 According to the Court, application
of the compelling interest test to these laws "contradict[ed] both
constitutional tradition and common sense." 6 The Court suggested
that the test should be applied only if the governmental action
intentionally targeted religious practices or beliefs, 7 implicated
another constitutional guarantee in conjunction with burdening
religious conduct,9" or failed to exempt a burdened practice despite
the existence of a system of laws which allowed for accommoda-
tion.99 Moreover, the Court felt that limiting the test's applicability
in the free exercise area would prevent judges from evaluating the
merits of asserted religious activity."°° Although the Court did not
overrule Sherbert or Yoder,' °1 the Smith decision, with a few excep-
(arguing that Smith decision "reverses" free exercise jurisprudence); Philip Spare, Comment, Free
Exercise of Religion: A New Translation, 96 DImL L. REv. 705, 705-06 (1992) (characterizing Smith
decision as "drastically" changing free exercise interpretation). But see Ryan, supra note 11, at
1416 ("The Smith decision undoubtedly completed the Court's gutting of the Free Exercise
Clause, but it seems clear that the clause had already been hollowed by the Court before
Smith.").
95. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).
96. Id. at 885. But see id. at 891 (O'ConnorJ, concurring in the judgment) (arguing that
compelling interest test should apply to laws of general applicability). Justice O'Connor
criticized the Court for narrowly interpreting past precedent and argued that the Court should
have retained the compelling interest test. Id. at 894-96. Nevertheless, in applying the
compelling interest testJustice O'Connor agreed that the criminal law did not violate the Free
Exercise Clause. Id. at 907.
97. Id, at 877-78. One scholar argues that the Court in Smith replaced the compelling
interest test with an "intentional discrimination standard." LaMacchia, supra note 54, at 123-25.
This standard differs from a rational basis review because the former allows courts to be neither
more nor less deferential to government interests. Id.
98. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82 (referring to combination claims as "hybrid" free exercise
claims and concluding that "[t]he present case does not present such a hybrid situation, but a
free exercise claim unconnected with any communicative activity or parental right").
99. Ld. at 884.
100. This concern was a primary motivation in the- Court's decision to eliminate the
compelling interest test. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, opined that it was "no more
appropriate for judges to determine the centrality of religious beliefs before applying a
compelling interest test in the free exercise field, than it would be for them to determine the
importance of ideas before applying the compelling interest test in the free speech field." Id
at 886-87.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 2-8 (commenting that Smith had distinguished its
holding from Sherbert and Yoder). But see Mawdsley, supra note 60, at 21-22 ("On its face, Smith
I, by refusing to create a religious exemption for neutral, uniformly applied criminal statute,
would appear to have reversed Yoder .... But even if Yoder still has vitality, the compelling
interest test discussed byJustice O'Connor in Smith Iis qualitatively different from the test in
Yoder.").
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tions, °2 eliminated the use of the compelling interest test in free
exercise jurisprudence.
3. The resurrection of the compelling interest test
In response to the Smith decision, Congress began drafting a bill
that would reinvigorate religious protection." Originally intro-
duced in 1990, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was intended
to minimize the impact of Smith by "restoring" the applicability of the
compelling interest test through a legislative enactment. 'M Con-
gress, however, did not pass RFRA until three years after its introduc-
tion because of strong opposition from pro-life groups," 5 debate
concerning the scope of the compelling interest test, 6 and consti-
tutional questions regarding congressional authority to pass
IR.. 107
Pro-life groups feared that RFRA would increase access to abortion
services because women would use the Act to claim that existing
statutes and regulations burdened religious rights.108  To ease these
concerns, the Senate Judiciary Committee included language in the
legislative history of the Act stating that RFRA would be neutral to the
102. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99 (listing situations in which Supreme Court
believes compelling interest test should be applied to free exercise claims).
103. See generally Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990: Hearings on H.R. 5377 Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on theJudiday, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990) [hereinafter 1990 House Hearings].
104. See Allan Ides, The Text of the Free Exercise Clause as a Measure of Employment Division v.
Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 135, 136-37 (1994) ("The
RFRA was expressly designed to return free exercise claims to their perceived legal status prior
to Smith, that is, to affirm the doctrinal legitimacy of Sherbert and Yoder, and, as RFRA's
proponents would have it, to return religious liberty to the United States.").
105. See Spare, supra note 94, at 731 (observing that chances of passage "diminished
significantly" because of abortion controversy); Wendy S. Whitbeck, Note, Restoring Rites and
Rejecting Wrongs: TheReligiousFreedom Restoration Act 18 SETON HALL LEGIS.J. 821,848-51 (1994)
(providing overview of abortion debate that accompanied congressional attempt to enact RFRA
in 1992).
106. SeeWhitbeck, supra note 105, at 852 (commenting that both proponents and opponents
of RFRA voiced concerns over proper scope of test).
107. See Lee, supra note 11, at 91-95 (commenting that constitutionality of RFRA will center
around whether section five of Fourteenth Amendment grants congressional authority to pass
RFRA). Lee concludes that "none of these [constitutional] concerns appears to be implicated
by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act." Id. at 94. But see Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F.
Supp. 355, 357 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that RFRA violates constitutional doctrine of separa-
tion of powers). The court found that RFRA impermissibly sought to overturn Smith, thereby
"intruding on the power and duty of the judiciary." Id. The Department ofJustice, however,
has indicated that it would appeal the decision in support of RFRA's constitutionality. SeeJerry
Sepor, Religious-freedom Ruling Faces Appea4 U.S. Wll Challenge FederalJudge's Overturning of Law,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at A4 (account of Justice Department's plan to appeal Flores
decision).
108. See Laycock, Religious Freedom, supra note 43, at 237-43 (outlining concerns voiced by
pro-life groups who opposed RFRA).
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abortion debate.' °9 Regarding the compelling interest test's applica-
tion, the Senate and HouseJudiciary Committees agreed that the "test
generally should not be construed more stringently or more leniently
than it was prior to Smith." 10 The other major source of debate
centered around the constitutional source of power that would enable
Congress to pass RFRA. The House and Senate Committees
determined that both Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment 1
and the Necessary and Proper Clause"2 permitted enactment of
RFRA." 3 After Congress resolved these issues and passed the bill,
President Clinton signed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act into
law on November 16, 1993."4
In its final form, RFRA offers a statutory alternative for people who
wish to challenge state-imposed burdens on religion.1" The Act
provides that the "government shall not substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability,"" 6 unless the government demonstrates that
"1) it is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and 2)
is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmen-
109. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 12, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A-N. 1892, 1901
(stating that Committee did not "seek to resolve the abortion debate through this legislation").
110. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 9, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898; HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 11, at 8.
111. See U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."); see also Lee, supra note 11, at 90-95
(explaining that enforcement power of Section Five of Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress
to pass RFRA).
112. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 18. This clause grants Congress the power "[t]o make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof." Id.; see also Whitbeck, supra note 105, at 865-67 (addressing
constitutional issues of RFRA).
113. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 9; SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 13-14, reprinted in
1993 U.S.C.CA.N 1892, 1902-03; see infra notes 111-18 and accompanying text (discussing
constitutional debate surrounding Congress' power to enact RFRA).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)4 (Supp. V 1993); see also President's Remarks on Signing the
Religions Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 29 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. DOC. 2377 (Nov. 16,
1993) (noting majestic quality of signing legislation that affirms right to religious freedom,
"perhaps the most precious of all religious liberties").
115. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 14 n.43, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.CAN. 1892, 1903-
04. The Senate Report stated:
While the act is intended to enforce the right guaranteed by the free exercise clause
of the first amendment, it does not purport to legislate the standard of review to be
applied by the Federal courts in cases brought under the constitutional provision.
Instead, it creates a new statutory prohibition on governmental action that substantially
burdens the free exercise of religion, except where such action is the least restrictive
means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.
I; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 15 n.3 ("Of course, the label 'restoration' in this
context is inappropriate. Congress writes laws-it does not and cannot overrule the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Constitution and thus it is unable to 'restore' a prior interpretation
of the First Amendment.").
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (Supp. V 1993).
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tal interest."1 7 Through this language, the Act purports to restore
the compelling interest test the Supreme Court applied in Sherbert and
Yoder.18
Because many commentators believe the Smith decision dramatical-
ly weakened religious protection under the Free Exercise Clause,119
parties are likely to choose to litigate under RFRA.t20 Commenta-
tors, however, differ on how the courts will apply and interpret
RFRA, even though the Act explicitly states that its purpose is to
restore the compelling interest test set forth in Sherbert and Yoder.'
While some scholars applaud the enactment of RFRA,123 others
argue that it will not dramatically increase the scope of religious
protection because courts prior to Smith had already started to put
religious freedom in "deep twilight."" Nevertheless, Congress
intended for the courts to apply pre-Smithjurisprudence in the hope
of restoring religious liberty under the Act." In the context of
zoning regulations that burden religious exercise, RFRA will be tested
on whether its pro-religious rhetoric can shift the line toward religious
liberty.
117. Id.
118. Id. § 2000bb. But see Szeptycki & Arnold, supra note 11, at 913 (arguing that test set
forth in RFRA differs textually from test enunciated by Supreme Court in Sherbert and Yoder).
119. See supra notes 46-76 and accompanying text (tracing development of compelling
interest test in Sherbert and Yoder).
120. See Laycock, Religious Freedom, supra note 43, at 254 (commenting that Court will not
have the opportunity to reconsider Smith because all religious claims will be litigated under
RFRA).
121. Compare Laycock, Religious Freedom, supra note 43, at 235 (stating that RFRA enacts
"universal standard") with Szeptycki &Arnold, supra note 11 ("While Congress has expressed the
clear intent that pre-Smith cases apply, it has provided no guide for courts faced with two or
more pre-Smith cases that conflict.").
122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1); see supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (describing
federal courts' post-Smith decisions that restricted scope of allowable religious activities).
123. See Mark G. Yudof, Religious Liberty in the Balancz, 47 S.M.U. L. REV. 353, 356-57 (1994)
(acknowledging efforts of Congress and American Jewish Congress in passing RFRA).
124. See Tushnet, supra note 45, at 121-22 (noting that only 23% of free exercise claims
succeeded at Supreme Court level between 1963 and 1990, 12% succeeded on federal appellate
level in early 1980s, and 16% succeeded at state supreme court level in 1989).
125. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 5 (stating that Smith decision has created "climate
in which the free exercise of religion is continually in jeopardy"); SENATE REPORT, supra note
10, at 8, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1897 (finding that legislation is necessary to assure
that "all Americans are free to follow their faiths free from governmental interference").
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H. ZONING V. RELIGION: BALANCING RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES AND
COMPETING GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS
A. Tension Between Zoning and the Free Exercise Clause
Although the Smith decision and the ensuing debate over RFRA
helped bring certain impacts of zoning into the public light, the
conflict between a state's zoning powers and the exercise of religious
freedom existed prior to both Smith and RFRA.12 I The courts have
held that a state may regulate certain uses of land in the interest of
the general welfare. 7 Because religious activities, much like secular
uses, may pose traffic, noise, safety, and economic problems for the
surrounding communities," 8 local governments have been allowed
to impose regulations on the religious use of land in order to curb
these problems. For example, courts have permitted governments to
exclude churches from residentially zoned areas'29 and bar individu-
als from conducting worship services in their home.1
°
The government's attempt to advance and preserve the general
welfare, however, also threatens conduct that is protected by the Free
Exercise Clause.' As one commentator observes, "Itihe Supreme
Court has recognized this tension, yet it has confirmed that religious
uses of land are within the general zoning power." 32  Therefore,
126. See Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 740-41 (11th Cir. 1983) (upholding
zoning restrictions that affect home worship), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984); Lakewood, Ohio
Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 309 (6th Cir.)
(finding constitutional city ordinance that prohibited construction of church in residential
neighborhood), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983).
127. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (discussing judicial recognition of state's
power to zone).
128. See Counts, supra note 46, at 1022-23 (outlining possible health and safety concerns
associated with churches). Churches may have a detrimental impact on the value of the
surrounding land due to their tax-exempt status. Although economic reasons may be more
suspect than the traditional health and safety concerns, municipalities generally do take into
account the economic impact of churches when enforcing zoning ordinances. Id. at 1022-25.
129. SeeLakewood, 699 F.2d at 307-09 (holding that generally applicable ordinance that zoned
area for residential dwellings did not infringe on congregation's right to free exercise even
though it prohibited religious group from constructing place of worship because building
church was not "fundamental tenet" of religion).
130. See Grosz, 721 F.2d at 741 (finding that zoning ordinance that barred individuals from
conducting worship services in home did not violate First Amendment because law had secular
purpose in furthering goals of increasing safety and reducing traffic noise).
131. See Laurie Reynolds, Zoning the Church: The Police Powers Versus the First Amendment, 64
B.U. L. REV. 767, 767 (1985) ("All government regulation that affects or constrains any activity
undertaken by a religious group is a potential violation of the constitutionally protected right
to free exercise of religion .... Zoning ordinances are no exception.").
132. Reynolds, supra note 131, at 767 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)); see also Michael W. Macleod-Ball, Comment, The
Future of ZomingLimitations Upon Rehgious Uses of Land. Due Process orEqual Protection?, 22 SUFFOLK
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courts are often called on to define the acceptable boundaries
between a state's exercise of its zoning powers and an individual's
exercise of religion. 3
In the past, courts have used a variety of standards to evaluate the
validity of zoning ordinances, often producing varying degrees of
protection for religious freedom."M Also, like other areas of law in
which state action affects religious interests, courts have struggled to
determine whether zoning implicates conduct protected by the Free
Exercise Clause." Complicating this task is the underlying concern
that exemptions for activities conducted by religious organizations and
individuals, by virtue of the imprimatur of religion, may gain an
unfair advantage over identical activities performed by secular
entities."3 6 For example, should a church be allowed to expand its
parking lot without the requisite permit while a neighboring store
must conform with the zoning law in order to expand its lot?" 7
Should a church-located homeless shelter be exempt from the zoning
U. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (1988) (observing that "[t]ension between the government's authority to
impose restrictions upon the use of land and the First Amendment protection afforded to the
pursuit of religious beliefs has culminated in differing jurisdictional treatment").
133. See, e.g., Christ College, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, No. 90-2406, 1991 WL 179102, at
*3-5 (4th Cir.) (evaluating church's request for zoning exception in order to operate school on
residentially zoned property), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094 (1991); Christian Gospel Church, Inc.
v. City and County of San Francisco, 896 F.2d 1221, 1223-25 (9th Cir.) (deciding challenge to
ordinance requiring church to obtain conditional use permit), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 999 (1990);
Grosz, 721 F.2d at 738-40 (determining validity of zoning ordinances affecting home worship);
Lakewood, 699 F.2d at 306-08 (deciding whether congregation may build church in residentially
zoned neighborhood).
134. See, e.g., Messiah Baptist Church v. County ofJefferson, 859 F.2d 820, 822-23 (10th Cir.
1988) (using due process analysis to affirm validity of zoning ordinance that barred church from
agricultural zone); Islamic Ctr. of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Starkville, 840 F.2d 293,299 (5th Cir.
1988) (employing compelling interest test to find exclusion of church from city limits violative
of Free Exercise Clause); Grosz, 721 F.2d at 738-41 (balancing government interest against
religious interest to determine that ordinance prohibiting religious services in home is
constitutional); see also Scott D. Godshall, Land Use Regulation and the Free Exercise Clause, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 1562, 1564 (1984) (stating that courts often "assume that the regulation of
church property presents no infringement of First Amendment rights, and approve the
regulation in issue without reference to the free exercise clause"); Reynolds, supra note 131, at
771 (commenting that courts often "ignore or misinterpret" First Amendment protections
involved in regulating religious uses); Wehener, supra note 42, at 511-23 (observing that courts
have considered variety of claims in land use controversies despite existence of free exercise
claim).
135. See Reynolds, supra note 131, at 771-75 (outlining problems in attempting to define
religion for zoning purposes).
136. See Berg, supra note 15, at 45-51 (commenting that exemptions from regulations run
risk of promoting religious-affiliated services over secular alternatives); Stanley Ingber, Judging
withoutJudgment: Constitutional Inrelevancies and the Demise of Dialogue, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1473,
1636 (1994) (observing that legislative accommodations would "create a system of perpetual
conflict" due to non-uniform pattern of special treatment for religious interests).
137. Cf Germantown Seventh Day Adventist Church v. City of Philadelphia, No, 94-1633,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12163, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1994) (determining whether city's
revocation of church's permit to expand facilities violated church's constitutional rights).
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law while a non-profit secular soup kitchen must meet applicable
zoning requirements for the purposes of its location?' Because
the First Amendment's Establishment Clause imposes limits on state
involvement with religion,'39 courts must carefully weigh both
governmental and religious interests before exempting individuals and
organizations from neutral and generally applicable zoning laws.
In attempting to accommodate both zoning and religious interests,
however, pre-Smith courts have been criticized for adopting a myopic
view of free exercise protections."4 Therefore, the seemingly
insensitive exclusion of religious organizations and prohibition of
church-related activities by zoning ordinances was not a new phenom-
enon.
The Smith decision only exacerbated the fear that zoning ordinanc-
es would finally run "roughshod" over religious liberties.141 Spon-
sors and advocates of RFRA who recognize the conflict between
zoning and religion, may hope that the Act will provide the ideal
balance for religious liberties and competing governmental interests.
Despite the stringency of the compelling interest test, however, the
Act may not be the boon envisioned by those who find religious
freedom burdened by zoning ordinances.'4
B. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Utility of the
Compelling Interest Test in the Realm of Zoning
Despite the overwhelmingly pro-religious rhetoric of RFRA's
sponsors and advocates, 43 Congress passed the law simply to restore
138. Cf Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538, 547
(D.D.C. 1994) (holding that church feeding program was religious activity substantially
burdened by application of zoning regulations).
139. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
140. See Counts, supra note 46, at 1029-30 (criticizing Sixth Circuit's free exercise analysis
involving congregation's desire to build church); Godshall, supranote 134, at 1574 (commenting
that religious conduct analysis in zoning may lead to "unnecessarily restrictive results").
141. See 139 CONG. REC. S14,351 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
("'Since Smith was decided, governments throughout the U.S. have run roughshod over religious
conviction. Churches have been zoned even out of commercial areas.'" (quoting Rev. Oliver
S. Thomas)); cf id& at S14,353 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (arguing that string of post-Smith lower
court decisions had overridden religious liberty interest thus reaffirming that First Amendment
"has been seriously eroded" by elimination of compelling interest test in Smith).
142. See infra notes 150-98 and accompanying text (illustrating shortcomings of RFRA due
to Act's inability to resolve threshold issues of compelling interest test).
143. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. H8714 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep. Schumer)
("This is a good moment for those of us who believe in the flower of religious freedom that so
adorns America, because it is so important for us to allow that freedom to flourish and not to
come down on it unless we really have to."); id at H8715 (statement of Rep. Hoyer) ("Our
decision today can remedy a decision which posed great risk to the religious rights of all Ameri-
cans. Religious freedom will again be a fundamental constitutional right."); 139 CONG. REC.
S14,469 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Bradley) ("Mr. President, I believe this bill
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"the legal standard [compelling interest test] that was applied in
[pre-Smith] decisions."'" Although RFRA provides a "uniform"
standard of review, Congress failed to address the inadequacies and
shortcomings of pre-Smith case law."4  Even assuming that the
compelling interest test of RFRA is intended to restore free exercise
protections to the days of Sherbert and Yoder," - courts apply the
standard only after a claimant proves that an "exercise of religion" is
"substantially burdened" by the government.'47 In the conflict
between zoning and religion, these inquiries were problematic for
free exercise claimants even under pre-Smith case law."~ Therefore,
the real test will be whether RFRA claims can trigger the compelling
interest test by satisfying these two thresholds."' Because the Act
does little to change the way courts determine whether state action
"substantially burdens" an "exercise of religion," claimants who file
under RFRA will still face difficulties freeing themselves from zoning
regulations.
1. "Exercise of religion"
RFRA defines religious exercise as "the exercise of religion under
the First Amendment to the Constitution."5 ° The definition, itself,
is tautological and offers no meaningful framework.'51 In fact, it
may reflect the overall fear that any definition may violate the religion
breathes new life into the protections we give for the free exercise of religion and ensures that,
like freedom of speech and freedom from discrimination, freedom of religion will again be
restored as a constitutional norm, not an anomaly.").
144. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 7; SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 9, reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898.
145. Seesupranote 121 (notingscholars' disagreementas towhetherRFRAprovidesworkable
standard for courts in religious freedom cases).
146. See supra notes 123-124 and accompanying text (highlighting areas of scholarly debate
surrounding RFRA).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(2) (Supp. V 1993).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 135-140 (describing problems faced by courts when
deciding whether religious organizations are exempt from zoning laws).
149. Because the "exercise of religion" and the "substantial burden" thresholds are distinct
conceptually, failure to meet one threshold should not require examination of the other to
determine the applicability of the two-part compelling interest test. Nevertheless, courts in
practice tend to address both thresholds, regardless of whether one threshold has or has not
been met. See Christ College, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, No. 90-2406, 1991 WL 179102, at *4-5
(4th Cir. Nov. 21, 1991) (addressing whether church's preference to locate on residential
property was linked to religious imperatives and the degree to which the zoning ordinance
impaired religious. practice); Lakewood, Ohio Congregation ofJehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City
of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303,306-08 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983) (evaluating nature
of religious observance and nature of burden placed on practice).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (Supp. V 1993).
151. But see 1991 HOUSE HEARINGS, supra note 15, at 130 (letter to Rep. Edwards from Rep.
Solarz) ("The Religious Freedom Restoration Act avoids codifying either extreme by protecting
the 'exercise of religion,' a term sufficiently familiar to the courts to provide a useful framework
for application of the Act.").
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clauses of the First Amendment' 52 Evidence in the legislative
history of RFRA suggests that Congress felt the courts were better
suited to determine what constitutes an "exercise of religion" for First
Amendment purposes.
15 3
Although the Supreme Court has cautioned against "dissecting"
religious beliefs to determine whether such beliefs deserve First
Amendment protections,5 4 lower courts in zoning cases have
evaluated both the "sincerity" and "centrality" of the asserted interest
to distinguish between religious and secular conduct.155  The
drafters of RFRA apparently recognized the need to distinguish
between secular and religious conduct.156  Representative Solarz, a
chief sponsor of RFRA, stated:
Although a devout individual might identify some religious aspect
to many everyday actions, it would, as a general rule, not be
accurate to describe everything that person does as an "exercise of
religion." The challenge in drafting this legislation was to indicate
Congress' intent to distinguish between practices which may have
some religious content but which are essentially secular in nature,
and those practices which are clearly exercises of religion.
57
Although the text of RFRA does not address whether the courts are
precluded from testing the sincerity and centrality of the burdened
conduct, the Act appears to allow such judicial inquiries because of
Supreme Court precedent. For example, the Act explicitly mentions
152. See NoWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 46, at 1213 (commenting that attempts to define
religion raise both Establishment Clause and free exercise concerns); supra note 44 (explaining
existence of two religion clauses in First Amendment).
153. See 1991 HOUSE HEARINGS, supra note 15, at 130 (letter to Rep. Edwards from Rep.
Solarz) (stating that RFRA's sensible approach to First Amendment is to allow courts to
determine exercise of religion on case-by-case basis); 139 CONG. REc. S14,362 (daily ed. Oct. 26,
1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (commenting that courts have adequate "analytical tools" to
distinguish between false and legitimate religious interests).
154. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714-16 (1981)
(stating that religious beliefs "need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to
others in order to merit First Amendment Protections").
155. See, eg., Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 735-36 (1983) (stating that courts
examine whether conduct is rooted in religious belief or involves only secular, philosophical, or
personal choices), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984); Lakewood, Ohio Congregation ofJehovah's
Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 669 F.2d 203, 306 (6th Cir.) ("The centrality of the
burdened religious observance to the believer's faith influences the determination of an
infringement."), cert. denied 464 U.S. 815 (1983); First Assembly of God v. Collier County, 775
F. Supp. 383, 387 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (observing that operation of homeless shelters is somewhat
removed from central religious activity of prayer), affd, 20 F.3d 419, modified, 27 F.3d 526 (11th
Cir. 1994), cert. denipd, 115 S. Ct. 730 (1995).
156. See 1991 HOUSE HEARINGS, supra note 15, at 128-30 (letter to Rep. Edwards from Rep.
Solarz) (concluding that RFRA used phrase "exercise of religion" to avoid defining religion and
to allow courts to decide meaning on case-by-case basis).
157. 1991 HOUSE HEARINGS, supra note 15, at 128-29 (letter to Rep. Edwards from Rep.
Solarz).
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Yoder, a decision in which the Court engaged in this type of analy-
sis.
158
Determining the sincerity of religious conduct involves assessing the
good faith claim that the conduct is rooted in religious rather than
secular belief.'59 Centrality involves assessing the importance of the
conduct with respect to the doctrines and tenets of the religion as it
pertains to the participants."6 Prior to the Court's almost complete
abrogation of the compelling interest test in Smith, lower courts found
no need to apply the test by treating sincerity and centrality as
threshold inquiries.'' If the governmental action burdened secular
conduct, no cognizable free exercise right existed to justify applica-
tion of the compelling interest test. 62 In free exercise claims that
challenge zoning ordinances, courts have used this distinction to
uphold the validity of governmental action.
In Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of
Lakewood,"6 a congregation wanted to relocate to a new site because
its current storefront facility proved insufficient for accommodating
its worshipping needs."6 When the congregation sought approval
to construct a church on its new lot, however, the Building Commis-
sion of Lakewood denied the necessary permit because the area was
zoned for residential use only."6 In determining the constitutional-
ity of the ordinance, a Sixth Circuit panel held that construction of
a church was not a "fundamental tenet" or a "cardinal principle" of
the Ohio Congregation's faith and was therefore considered a "purely
secular" activity.'" Because the ordinance did not infringe upon
158. See supra text accompanying notes 72-76 (discussing Yoder and describing Court's
application of compelling interest test in Sherbert).
159. SeeWisconsin v.Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,215-16 (1972) ("Away of life, however virtuous and
admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation... if it is based on
purely secular considerations .... [I]o have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims
must be rooted in religious belief."); see also Godshall, supra note 134, at 1573 (discussing
sincerity requirement in assessing free exercise claim involving zoning).
160. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216 (characterizing Amish way of life as "fundamental" to their
faith); Godshall, supra note 134, at 1573-74 (defining centrality and discussing its application to
prohibit construction of church).
161. One commentator argues that pre-Smithjurisprudence encouraged courts to evaluate
the place that "the burdened activity had in a believer's religious universe" and placed "judges
in an authoritative position over religious belief in an idolatrous manner." Tushnet, supra note
45, at 138.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 72-76 (describing Court's method of defining free
exercise of religion in Yoder).
163. 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir.), cert. den/Ae, 464 U.S. 815 (1983).
164. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699
F.2d 303, 304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983).
165. Id at 305.
166. Id. at 307. But see Counts, supra note 46, at 1030 (criticizing Lakewood decision for
failing to recognize that denial of right to construct church does effectively deny right to
worship).
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religious conduct, the court did not require the government to offer
a compelling state interest or use the least restrictive zoning
scheme. 67 Thus, applying a due process rational basis test, the
court upheld the church's exclusion from a residentially zoned
area.
168
The decision in Lakewood demonstrates that even prior to Smith,
zoning ordinances successfully excluded churches from certain areas
of town. 69 Although the Smith decision added a new hurdle for
religious liberty, claimants challenging neutral and generally applica-
ble zoning laws still wrestled with the secular/religious distinction that
existed during pre-Smith days. Therefore, even with the reinstatement
of the compelling interest test, RFRA will not increase the likelihood
that claims will pass the "exercise of religion" threshold because the
Act does not alter the way courts distinguish between religious and
secular conduct.
For example, it is unlikely that RFRA can change the outcome of
post-Smith cases such as Christ College, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors.1
°
In Christ College, the Fourth Circuit held that the Free Exercise Clause
did not require a county to grant a zoning exemption to a religious
school.17' Christ College wanted to conduct night classes in three
renovated homes that were restricted for residential use only.12 In
deciding the case, the court stated explicitly that it did not need to
address whether the Smith holding applied to the school's claim.1
7
1
Because the school's preference to locate on residential property was
not "linked to religious imperatives," the court found no burden on
the exercise of religion. 4 If RFRA had been available at the time
Christ College filed its claim, the relevant standard of review would
have been the compelling interest test. The chances for success,
however, would not have increased because the "exercise of religion"
threshold would still be a prerequisite to invoke the test.
167. Lakewood, 699 F.2d at 308.
168. Id.
169. See Messiah Baptist Church v. County ofJefferson, 859 F.2d 820, 827 (10th Cir. 1988)
(concluding that ordinance that barred religious group from constructing church in area zoned
for agriculture did not violate Tight to free exercise); Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729,
740-41 (11th Cir. 1983) (upholding ordinance that effectively barred individuals from
conducting worship services in residences located in certain areas of city), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
827 (1984); Lakewood, 699 F.2d at 307-09 (finding constitutional statute that prohibited religious
group from erecting church in residentially zoned areas).
170. No. 90-2406, 1991 WL 179102 (4th Cir. Nov. 21, 1991).
171. Christ College, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, No. 90-2406, 1991 WL 179102, at *4-5 (4th
Cir.), cert. denie, 502 U.S. 1094 (1991).
172. Id. at *2.
173. Id. at *4.
174. Id. at *4-5.
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Both Lakewood and Christ College illustrate the obstacles that face free
exercise claimants who challenge land use regulations. In each case,
one can argue that a religiously motivated desire to spread the Word
of God or promote religious education prompted the claimants to
seek an exemption from the zoning ordinances. The courts in
Lakewood and Christ College, however, chose to adopt a plausible yet
arguably myopic view that the asserted conduct was a secular desire
to relocate to more preferable locations. 5 Under RFRA, courts
must continue to determine whether the asserted interest in locating
to a certain area or. using property in a certain way is based on
religious rather than secular concerns. RFRA offers no solution to
this sensitive inquiry because the Act leaves the judge as sole
gatekeeper of this threshold.1
76
2. "Substantial burden"
In cases where conduct qualifies as an exercise of religion, the
government-imposed burden on the religious believer must be
substantial in order to invoke the compelling interest test of
RFRAJ1 77  The Senate Judiciary Committee report indicated that
courts should examine pre-Smith cases to determine whether
government action "substantially burdens" religion.'78 Similarly, the
House report stated that courts are expected to examine cases
decided prior to Smith in order to determine if governmental action
has a "substantial external impact" on religion. 79 Because courts
have often found that zoning ordinances do not impose impermissible
burdens on religion, 8 RFRA's re-affirmation of this prerequisite
175. See Laycock, Free Eercise, supra note 19, at 894 (observing that churches encounter
insurmountable difficulties in claiming that desire to locate in certain area is related to religious
tenets).
176. See Tushnet, supra note 45, at 138 (observing that evaluating centrality of religious
beliefs places judge in "an authoritative position ... in an idolatrous manner").
177. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1993).
178. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 8-9, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.CA.N. 1892, 1898.
179. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 6-7.
180. See, e.g., Christ College, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, No. 90-2406, 1991 WL 179102, at
*4 (4th Cir.) (holding that denial of exemption to conduct classes in residential area did not
burden exercise of religion), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094 (1991); Christian Gospel Church, Inc.
v. City and County of San Francisco, 896 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 498 U.S. 999
(1990) (holding that denial of permit to worship in home did not burden religion); Grosz v.
City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 739 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984)
(holding that ordinance preventing home worship does not impermissibly burden religion);
Lakewood, Ohio Congregation ofJehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303,
307 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983) (holding that prohibition on building of church
in residential area does not burden religion).
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does not bode well for free exercise claimants seeking religious
freedom under the Act.' 8 '
Interpreting pre-Smith free exercise cases, lower courts have held
that zoning ordinances do not impermissibly burden religion absent
"criminal liability, loss of livelihood, or denial of a basic income-
sustaining public welfare benefit."8 2 In particular, ordinances that
imposed "indirect financial" burdens"s and limited "geographical
options" "s4 have survived free exercise challenges. This interpreta-
tion of substantial burden dramatically narrows the scope of conduct
that is exempt from zoning laws."ta The decision in Christian Gospel
Church, Inc. v. City and County of San Franciscol 6 illustrates how the
substantial burden inquiry can preclude application of the compelling
interest test in zoning disputes.
In Christian Gospel Church, a religious organization was denied a
permit to practice home worship in an area exclusively zoned for
residential use.'87 The church claimed that denial of the permit
violated the Free Exercise Clause because worshipping in a home
constituted a fundamental part of its religious belief."t Conducting
a three-part analysis,8 9 the Ninth Circuit found no significant
181. See Reynolds, supra note 131, at 778-79 (explaining that substantial burden requirement
cannot be met by plaintiffs who challenge exclusion of church from residential zones). In the
context of exclusionary zoning, Reynolds argues that current Supreme Court doctrine makes it
difficult for plaintiffs to prove a substantial burdeh because they must show that "exclusion from
residential areas will prohibit or gravely endanger the continuation of a religious practice, or
coerce individuals into violation of religious beliefs." Id.
182. Grosz, 721 F.2d at 739 (interpreting Prince v. Massachusetts, 312 U.S. 158 (1944),
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), and
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)); see also Lakewood, 699 F.2d at 307 (commenting that
ordinance did not pressure congregation to abandon beliefs through financial or criminal
penalties).
183. Lakewood, 699 F.2d at 307.
184. Christ Colleg, 1991 WL 179102, at *4.
185. See Reynolds, supra note 131, at 778-79 (commenting on degree of difficulty in satisfying
substantial burden prerequisite); see also Counts, supra note 46, at 1030-31 (arguing that
exclusion of churches from residential areas constitutes burden on religious practice); Godshall,
supra note 134, at 1575-76 (criticizing zoning decisions for manipulating Supreme Court cases
and narrowing range of burdens on religious practices); Wehener, supra note 42, at 497-503
(observing that free exercise claims involving home worship have failed because of courts'
reluctance to find existence of substantial burden).
186. 896 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 999 (1990).
187. Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 896 F.2d 1221, 1222-
23 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 999 (1990).
188. Id. at 1224.
189. The court's analysis in Christian Gospel Church involved the following.
1) the magnitude of the statute's impact upon the exercise of the religious belief; 2)
the existence of a compelling state interest justifying the imposed burden upon the
exercise of the religious belief; and 3) the extent to which recognition of an exemption
from the statute would impede the objectives sought to be advanced by the state.
I& Although this test appears similar to a compelling interest analysis, the court balanced the
burden on religious conduct against the burden on the government in accommodating the
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burden on religion and upheld the zoning scheme.' 9° Because the
church could "find another home or another forum for worship," the
court held that the burden was merely one of "convenience and
expense" to the church and therefore was minimal. 9'
The court's burden analysis in Christian Gospel Church can be
criticized in many ways.192  Nevertheless, the analysis reflects the
trend in free exercise jurisprudence toward the narrow definition of
religious burden that existed prior to Smith. 9 The text and legis-
lative history of RFRA fail to provide a clear answer as to whether
courts should expand their treatment of the substantial burden
requirement. 94
Originally, the House version of RFRA merely required a "burden"
on the exercise of religion in order to invoke the compelling interest
test.195 Subsequently, a technical amendment was passed in the
religious interests. Id. at 1224-25. See generally Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 738-
40 (11th Cir. 1983) (applying balancing test to determine whether ordinance violates Free
Exercise Clause), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984). It remains unclear whether this type of
analysis is permissible under RFRA. See supra text accompanying note 117 (providing text of
compelling interest test). Language in the statute indicates that some type of balancing between
the religious interest and the government interest may be necessary. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb
(Supp. V 1993) (stating that "the compelling interest test ... is a workable test for striking
sensible balances between religious liberty and competing governmental interests").
Nevertheless, both approaches require a determination of whether governmental action
constitutes a burden on religion.
190. Christian Gospel Church, 896 F.2d at 1224.
191. Id. The court proceeded to evaluate the government's interest and found that the city
had a "strong interest in the maintenance of the integrity of its zoning scheme and the
protection of its residential neighborhoods." Id.
192. See Wehener, supra note 42, at 500 (arguing that decision contradicts Supreme Court
precedent and characterizing court's substantial burden analysis as "cavalier").
193. See supra text accompanying notes 79-85 (describing Court's reluctance to expand
religious protection by narrowly defining religious burden).
194. See, eg., Berg, supra note 15, at 51 (commenting that text and legislative history ofRFRA
do not precisely define substantial burden requirement); Ides, supra note 104, at 153 (arguing
that legislative history of Act offers no indication as to how substantial burden requirement
.comports with text of the Constitution"); Szeptycki & Arnold, supra note 11, at 916:
The intent expressed in the legislative history and the text of the Act itself is
sufficiently clear that most courts will simply apply free exercise law as it existed prior
to Smith in interpreting the Act. There are numerous gaps and ambiguities in the case
law which complicates fulfilling that intent. The Act, moreover, imposes a test that
represents the nadir of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.
Id.
The confusion over the substantial burden requirement is reflected in the House and Senate
Reports of RFRA. For example, the House Report suggests a broad interpretation of substantial
burden, stating that "government activity need not coerce individuals into violating their
religious beliefs nor penalize religious activity by denying any person an equal share of the
rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by any citizen" in order for the statute to apply. HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 10, at 6. The Senate Report does not contain this language, but rather states
that RFRA does not require justification for government actions that "may have some incidental
effect on religious institutions." SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 9, reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898.
195. H.R. 1308, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993).
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Senate to ensure that only state action which "substantially" burdens
the exercise of religion would be subject to the test.196 Although
the significance of the amendment can be debated, 97 RFRA does
not provide an adequate definition of "substantial burden." 9 ' Thus,
claimants who challenge zoning ordinances under RFRA may still be
precluded from reaching the crux of the Act-the compelling interest
test.
IIl. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE REVISITED: RELIGIOUS
PROTECTION AMER EMPLOYMENT DMSIoN v. SMITH
Because RFRA does not resolve the threshold problems encoun-
tered by free exercise claimants,"9 courts may avoid the application
of the compelling interest test by determining that the zoning law
does not substantially burden the exercise of religion. Although
sponsors and advocates of RFRA expressed concern for those who
were burdened by overly restrictive zoning ordinances,2"° it appears
that reinstatement of the compelling interest test will not provide
adequate relief. As a result, the Act's perceived impact of increasing
religious protection from zoning laws may be exaggerated.0
In addition, the view that Smith's abrogation of the compelling
interest test would allow zoning ordinances to run "roughshod" over
religious liberties may have been premature.0 2 While RFRA was
intended to mitigate the impact of Smith by restoring the test for cases
challenging neutral zoning laws of general applicability,0 3 the test
did not completely disappear after the Smith decision. Even without
the aid of RFRA, three viable arguments exist tojustify application of
196. 189 CONG. REC. S14,352 (daily ed. Oct. 26,1993) (documentingpassage ofAmendment
No. 1082).
197. Compare 139 CONG. REC. H8714 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep. Brooks)
(commenting that amendment is consistent with intent of House bill) withid. (statement of Rep.
Hyde) (expressing concern that amendment adds "tone of indefiniteness" regarding types of
burdens protected under RFRA).
198. See generally Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2 (Supp. V
1993) (failing to provide definition of "substantial burden" in definition section of statute).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 150-98 (arguing that RFRA does not adequately
address threshold problems faced by those who challenge zoning ordinances).
200. See 139 CONG. RECQ S14,353 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (using
zoning case to buttress argument for passage of bill); see also 139 CONG. REc. H2360 (daily ed.
May 11, 1993) (statement of Rep. Schumer) (describing impact of Smith as lending to "parade
of horribles" including zoning cases).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 18-22 (illustrating possible application of RFRA in
challenging zoning ordinances).
202. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 8-9, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1897-98
(restoring legal standard to pre-Smith status); 139 CONG. REc. S14,351 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy) (describing government's lack of respect for religion after Smith).
203. See supra notes 12, 15 and accompanying text (reviewing legislative intent to address
adverse effects of zoning ordinances caused by Smith decision).
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the compelling interest test.2 °4  Admittedly, because RFRA will no
longer require claimants to find these "loopholes" in Smith's general
rule, claimants who find themselves burdened by zoning ordinances
should file under RFRA. Nevertheless, the courts have recognized the
feasibility of these loopholes in deciding cases challenging zoning
ordinances.20 5 Because the decision in Smith has not been overruled
and maintains its precedential value,2°8 post-Smith free exercise
jurisprudence will be used as a comparative guide in order to
illustrate that RFRA's reinstatement of the compelling interest test
may have been a minimal change from Smith's interpretation of Free
Exercise Clause protections.
A. Government Action Targeting Religious Conduct or Belief
The Court in Smith acknowledged that governmental action would
violate the Free Exercise Clause if it banned religious conduct "for
religious reasons or only because of the religious belief that they
display."207 The Court also suggested that classifications based on
religion would be subject to the compelling interest test °20  Admit-
tedly, claimants in zoning challenges still face the difficult task of
proving that the law targets religious rather than secular conduct.
209
Nevertheless, as illustrated by the Supreme Court's decision in Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,21° this exception to
Smith's general rule remains a viable option for challenging ordinanc-
es that purport to be neutral and generally applicable.
Ironically, the Court in Lukumi Babalu Aye, applying post-Smith free
exercise jurisprudence, decided in favor of the religious interest and
204. The compelling interest test is applied if the government action intentionally targets
religion, concurrently raises another concern, or acknowledges an existing system allowing for
accommodation. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99 (setting forth instances when court
should apply compelling interest test in free exercise jurisprudence).
205. See Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 471 (8th Cir. 1991)
(remanding to district court for evaluation equal protection challenge to zoning ordinance);
Church ofJesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v.Jefferson County, 741 F. Supp. 1522, 1535 (N.D.
Ala. 1990) (finding violation of First and Fourteenth Amendments in county's rezoning
procedures).
206. See Laycock, Religious Freedom, supra note 43, at 254 ("Once RFRA is enacted, all cases
will be litigated under the statute, and the Court will have no occasion to reconsider Smith.").
207. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
208. See id. at 886 n.3 ("Just as we subject to the mosi exacting scrutiny laws that make
classifications based on race.... so too we strictly scrutinize governmental classifications based
on religion.") (internal citations omitted); Ryan, supra note 11, at 1444 (observing that Smith
holding does not apply to laws that intentionally target or discriminate against religion).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 159-68 (discussing religious/secular conduct
distinction in pre-Smith free exercise jurisprudence); cf. Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (stressing that it
is "not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a
faith").
210. 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
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invalidated a system of zoning, health, and animal cruelty ordinances
that prohibited animal sacrifice within city limits. 211 In Lukumi
Babalu Aye, the church disclosed plans to construct a house of worship
in the city and to conduct religious rituals, such as animal sacrifice,
on its property.2 2 The Court held that the city specifically targeted
the church's religious conduct, finding that the ordinances were
drafted in such a way as to constitute a "'religious gerrymander."'
21 3
Relying on Smith, the Court applied the compelling interest test and
found that the ordinances were not narrowly tailored to achieve the
city's interest in protecting the public health.1 4
In Lukumi Babalu Aye, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause
requires more than facial neutrality and "protects against government
hostility which is masked."215  Because the object of the city's
ordinances was to suppress religion, the city's actions violated the
mandates of the Free Exercise Clause.216 Although it is difficult to
gauge whether this neutrality requirement will provide a sufficient
route to the compelling interest test, the decision in Lukumi Babalu
Aye indicates that government officials cannot automatically sanitize
an impermissible motive by claiming that an ordinance is facially
neutral, even under Smith's interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause. 217 Based on this rationale, facially neutral zoning ordinanc-
211. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217,2234 (1993);
see id. at 2234-39 (setting forth provisions of ordinances).
212. Id. at 2223.
213. Id. at 2228 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
214. Id. at 2227-28.
215. Id. at 2227. One commentator observed that the Court adopted a Free Exercise
definition of neutrality that is similar to the definition used in equal protection cases. SeeDiane
Schulze, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-A Non-Neutral Law Proscribing Religious Animal
Sacnfice That is Not Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Compelling Government Interest Where Such Law Fails
to Prohibit Non-Religious Conduct Resulting in Similar Harms Sought to be Addressed, 24 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1671, 1693-99 (1993) (providing overview ofJustice Kennedy's decision in LukumiBabalu
Aye).
216. Lukumi Babalu Aye 113 S. Ct. at 2234.
217. See id. ("Those in office must be resolute in resisting importunate demands and must
ensure that the sole reasons for imposing the burdens of law and regulation are secular.
Legislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed to persecute or oppress a
religion or its practices."). But see First Assembly of God v. Collier County, 20 F.3d 419, 423
(11th Cir.) (relying on Lukumi Babalu Aye decision but requiring only facial neutrality for
ordinance prohibiting homeless shelter on church property), modf ied, 27 F.3d 526 (11th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 730 (1995). In Frst Assembly, the court ended its analysis once it
determined that the ordinance was "facially neutral" and failed to conduct any meaningful
inquiry into whether the ordinance was passed due to neighborhood animosity. See id. (finding
no intent in ordinance to inhibit or oppress any religion). The circumstances in First Assembly,
however, suggest that enough neighborhood animosity contributed to the shelters closing to
warrant a closer inquiry by the court. See id. at 420 (indicating that zoning board closed shelter
after "great community distress" over its operation on church property).
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es that are passed as a result of animus toward a particular church or
religious practice will still be subject to the compelling interest test.
B. Existing System of Exemptions
Related to the ruling that laws impermissibly targeting religion are
subject to the compelling interest test, the Court in Smith stated that
"where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it
may not refuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship'
without compelling reason."218 Although the Court in Smith did not
explicitly state whether this proposition applies outside of the
unemployment context,219 the Court in Lukumi Babalu Aye appears
to recognize its applicability to other areas of the law.220
One of the ordinances examined in Lukumi Babalu Aye adopted
Florida's animal cruelty statute, which prohibited only "unnecessary"
killings of animals.221 Under this ordinance, necessary killings
included "hunting, slaughter of animals for food, eradication of
insects and pests, and euthanasia" while killings for religious reasons
were classified as unnecessary.222  To determine whether conduct
was prohibited, the ordinance required an evaluation of the reasons
for the killings.2  Quoting Smith, the Court in Lukumi Babalu Aye
held that the city's animal cruelty ordinance represented an "'individ-
ualized ... assessment of... relevant conduct'"224 and qualified as
a system of individualized exemptions.2 Absent a compelling
reason, the city may not refuse to extend this system of exemptions
to the church's practice of animal sacrifice.226 Similarly, the Court
found that an ordinance prohibiting the killing of animals outside
certain zoned areas and exempting slaughtering for commercial
purposes was underinclusive as a means of protecting the public
health.2 7 Because the ordinance burdened religious conduct and
treated killings performed in slaughterhouses and killings performed
218. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
219. See id. ("Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the
unemployment compensation field, we would not apply it to require exemptions from a
generally applicable criminal law. The Sherbert test, it must be recalled, was developed in a
context that lent itself to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant
conduct.").
220. See Lukumi Babalu Ay4 113 S. Ct. at 2229 (holding that city impermissibly drafted system




224. Id. (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990)).
225. Id.
226. Md
227. Id. at 2233.
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by the church in a disparate manner, the Court applied "the most
rigorous of scrutiny" finding the evidence unconstitutional.228
The decision in Lukumi Babalu Aye invalidated the city's ordinances
based on a variety of factors.2" As a result, it is difficult to deter-
mine whether the city's refusal to extend individualized exemptions
to the church alone would have produced the same result.2"
Nevertheless, it appears that the compelling interest test will be
applicable if there exists both a system of exemptions and a substan-
tial burden on religious conduct. In the context of zoning, the
district court decision in Alpine Christian Fellowship v. County Commis-
sioners23 is perhaps more instructive because the court applied the
compelling interest test to determine whether denial of a special use
permit23 2 violated the Free Exercise Clause.
2 33
In Alpine Christian Fellowship, a religious organization applied for the
necessary permit to operate a school within its church building.
2 4
The application was denied by the county.25 Although the county
argued that its decision was based on secular reasons, the court held
that the denial substantially burdened the church's religious conduct
of providing "religious education to the members of the Church."2
Moreover, the court in Alpine Christian Fellowship reasoned that the
compelling interest test was the relevant standard of review because
the case involved an "individualized question" of whether the county
could validly deny the church an exemption from the ordinance.237
Applying the test, the court held that the county failed to offer a




229. See supra text accompanying notes 211-17 (pointing to need to do away with religious
gerrymandering, absence of compelling interest, overbroad character of ordinances, and lack
of facial neutrality as reasons for invalidating city's ordinances).
230. See Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2230 (stating that "[w]e need not decide whether
the [ordinance exempting slaughterhouses] could survive constitutional scrutiny if it existed
separately, it must be invalidated because it functions, with the rest of the enactments in
question, to suppress Santeria religious worship").
231. 870 F. Supp. 991 (D. Colo. 1994).
232. Instead of prohibiting an entire use from a zoned area, many systems allow for
exemptions under prescribed circumstances. See 2 ANDFmSON, supra note 25, at § 9.17
(describing devices used to make zoning system more flexible). A special use permit is a device
that allows a prohibited use on the land and minimizes adverse effects by enabling a review
board to foresee the impact of the proposed use. I&
233. Alpine Christian Fellowship v. County Comm'rs, 870 F. Supp. 991,994 (D. Colo. 1994).
234. Id at 992.
235. IM. Because operation of private schools was not permitted as a use by right on the
church's property, the church was required to apply for a special use permit. Id. at 992.
236. I& at 994.
237. IMt
238. I& at 995.
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Examining both the Lukumi Babalu Aye and the Alpine Christian
Fellowship decisions, it appears that laws containing a system of
exemptions are still subject to the compelling interest test when such
laws substantially burden religion."9 If courts adopt this interpreta-
tion, the compelling interest test may be available to a wide array of
claims challenging zoning ordinances because most zoning schemes
contain a system of "individualized" exemptions.240  Although
claimants must still demonstrate that the governmental action
substantially burdens religion, the door to the compelling interest test
remains open, even after the Smith decision.
C. The Hybrid Claim
The Supreme Court in Smith also suggested that the compelling
interest test may still apply to "hybrid" situations where another
constitutional right is asserted in conjunction with a free exercise
claim.24 Indeed, at least one commentator views this approach as
an effective way of limiting Smith's holding242 and several courts
after Smith have remanded cases to allow for reconsideration of
possible hybrid claims.2" Therefore, claimants who challenge
neutral and generally applicable zoning ordinances may similarly
"bootstrap" other constitutional protections in an attempt to invoke
the compelling interest test.
244
In Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings,245 the Eighth Circuit
declined to apply the compelling interest test. However, the court
remanded the case to allow the claimant to assert a hybrid claim.246
The Cornerstone Bible Church challenged an ordinance that
239. See Spare, supra note 94, at 727 (noting that laws, with built-in systems that allow for
exemptions, "are still entitled to a strict scrutiny test").
240. See 2 ANDERSON, supra note 25, at § 9.17 (commenting that many municipalities have
adopted various zoning techniques which "individualize" regulation of land use to permit greater
flexibility).
241. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (listing cases involving hybrid
situations).
242. See Ryan, supra note 11, at 1443-45 (commenting that hybrid claims may substantially
limit Smith holding because free exercise claims may contain numerous constitutional rights such
as freedom of speech and association).
243. See Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 473 (8th Cir. 1991)
(remanding case to district court to determine existence of hybrid claim); Salvation Army v.
Department of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 196-97 (3d Cir. 1990) (remanding to
determine whether ordinance infringes on both religious freedom and freedom of association
and speech).
244. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (stating that assertion of Free Exercise Clause violation in
conjunction with other constitutional violations may preclude application of neutral, generally
applicable law); Salvation Army, 919 F.2d at 196-97 (recognizingviability of hybrid claim to invoke
compelling state interest test).
245. 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1991).
246. Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 473 (8th Cir. 1991).
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excluded churches from a commercially zoned area, asserting that the
city violated its freedom of speech, freedom of association, equal
protection rights, and free exercise of religion. 247  The appellate
court held that the lower court had erroneously granted summary
judgment for the city on the church's free speech and equal protec-
tion claims.2' Although it affirmed summary judgment as to the
free exercise claim,249 the court remanded the case, stating "[o]ur
reversal of the summary judgment orders breathes life back into the
Church's 'hybrid rights' claim; thus the district court should consider
this claim on remand."20
The Eighth Circuit decision in Cornerstone Bible Church may not be
indicative of how most courts would rule if faced with a hybrid
claim.25 1  In addition, the hybrid claim has not received universal
praise among justices1 2 and commentators.25 3  Despite debate
over whether the hybrid claim will provide sufficient protection under
the Free Exercise Clause,M it appears that courts are willing to
consider it as an exception to Smith's holding. As a result, free
exercise claimants who are able to assert other constitutional
protections can still argue the applicability of the compelling interest
test during the post-Smith era of free exercise jurisprudence.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The decision in Smith and the ensuing outrage over the state of free
exercise jurisprudence provided the best opportunity to redefine the
scope of religious liberty. Congress, however, merely chose to restore
the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert and Yoder. 5
247. Id. at 467.
248. Id. at 470-72.
249. Id. at 472.
250. Id. at 473.
251. See Christ College, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, No. 90-2406, 1991 WL 179102, at *4
(4th Cir. Sept. 13) (declining to address validity of hybrid claim because plaintiff failed to
establish free exercise claim), cert. denie, 502 U.S. 1094 (1991); see also Wehener, supra note 42,
at 510-11 (attempting to reconcile holding in Cornerstone Bible Church with other decisions that
addressed validity of hybrid claims).
252. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 896-97 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring
injudgment) (characterizing Court's portrayal of Yoder and Cantwellas hybrid claims as attempt
at escape); id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court for "mischaracterizing" and
discarding free exercise cases by labelling them hybrid).
1 253. See Main, supra note 78, at 1469 (illustrating weaknesses in hybrid claim rationale);
Simoneau, supra note 94, at 172-73 (noting that hybrid claim exception is "extremely
troublesome" to some courts because of its complexity).
254. Compare Bradley D. Parkinson, Religion, Zoning and the Free Exercise Clause: The Impact
of Employment Division v. Smith, 7 B.Y.U.J. PUB. L. 395, 410-11 (1993) (suggesting that hybrid
claim can be useful tactic to bypass Smith's restrictive holding) with Simoneau, supra note 94, at
172-73 (arguing that application of hybrid test has proven problematic).
255. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (5) (Supp. V 1993).
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Although these two cases represented the high watermark of the
compelling interest test," 6 RFRA does not guarantee application of
the test to every claim asserting a religious interest. Because the Act
does not alter the way courts determine whether an "exercise of
religion" is "substantially burdened" by state action, religious
organizations and individuals may still find themselves running afoul
of zoning ordinances.
5 7
RFRA's failure to address adequately these two threshold issues was
likely a product of political necessity.' Although the drafters and
sponsors of RFRA expressed disapproval toward cases that upheld the
validity of certain types of zoning ordinances, RFRA was not meant to
overturn or codify the results of any particular court decision.5 9
Nevertheless, Congress could have provided more protection against
zoning ordinances without drastically departing from the overall
purpose of RFRA.
Because this Comment focuses on the utility of RFRA as it relates
to zoning, the proposed solutions will be geared toward addressing
the threshold problems faced by free exercise claims challenging
zoning ordinances. As a result, these solutions may be either
underinclusive or overinclusive in attempting to strike, "sensible
balances between religious liberty and competing... governmental
interests."2M The shortcomings of RFRA, however, may pose similar
problems to other types of free exercise challenges. Therefore, the
proposed solutions may also have relevance outside the context of
zoning.
256. See supra note 60 (describing Yoder's impact on free exercise jurisprudence); see also
Laycock, Re/igious Freedom, supra note 43, at 231 (stating that Sherbert and Yoder "rigorously
enforced" compelling interest test).
257. See supra notes 103-25, 143-49 and accompanying text (articulating limitations of RFRA
caused by continued need to meet dual threshold of "exercise of religion" and "substantial
burden").
258. See Berg, supra note 15, at 14 (observing that coalition supporting RFRA would
"evaporate" if other issues were specifically addressed); Ingber, supra note 136, at 1667
(suggesting that RFRA was drafted broadly in order to garner congressional support).
259. HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 7 (stating that RFRA's enactment was not intended
to approve or disapprove of results in any particular free exercise case); SENATE REPORT, supra
note 10, at 9, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898 (stating that RFRA does not codify results
of any prior free exercise case); see alsoLaycock, Religious Freedom, supra note 43, at 235 (arguing
that RFRA does not offer special advantages or disadvantages for certain claims).
260. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (5) (Supp. V 1993).
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A. "Exercise of Religion"
The drafters of RFRA were aware of the dangers in attempting to
formulate a statutory definition of religion.261 Therefore, Congress
left to the courts the task of conducting a case-by-case determination
of whether certain conduct falls within the scope of Free Exercise
Clause protections."' In the context of zoning, however, courts
have adopted an overly restrictive view of religious exercise. In order
to help solve this problem, RFRA should explicitly provide that
"conduct motivated by religious belief' would be protected under the
statute. As drafted, however, RFRA does not change the status quo
because it offers no helpful guidance by merely reasserting that the
"exercise of religion" shall be protected under the statute." In
fact, the term "motivated" appeared in an earlier version of RFRA, but
was omitted in subsequent drafts.2"
At first glance, this change may appear insignificant, yet the effect
would be important. Courts should recognize that conduct need not
be specifically mandated by religious tenets or beliefs. Looking to the
plain meaning,2" the word "motivate" means "to provide with
motive, impel, or incite."2" Therefore, any type of conduct that is
motivated by religious belief should fall within the parameters of
RFRA. This change should eliminate the requirement that people
261. See 1991 House Hearings, supra note 15, at 130 (letter to Rep. Edwards from Rep. Solarz)
(commenting that "[i ] t would be tragic if the effort to overturn Smith resulted in Congressional
inquisition into ... the content of religious law"); see also Laycock, Free Exercise, supra note 19,
at 900 (cautioning that promulgation of "official list of religions" would raise Establishment
Clause problems).
262. See 1991 House Hearings, supra note 15, at 130 (letter to Rep. Edwards from Rep. Solarz)
("RFRA follows the sensible approach of the First Amendment by leaving to the courts the job
of determining, on a case-by-case basis, whether or not a particular practice is indeed an exercise
of religion."); 139 CONG. REc. S14,363 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
(expressing confidence that courts will adequately distinguish between abusive claims and
* legitimate religious practices).
263. But cf 42 U.S.C. §2000bb (Supp. V 1993) (overlooking motivational aspect in wording
of statute).
264. H.R. 4040, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (finding that government should not burden
conduct motivated by religious belief without compellingjustification). In drafting H.R. 2797,
Representative Solarz chose to omit the word "motivated" because it generated "more heat than
light." 1991 House Hearings, supra note 15, at 128 (letter to Rep. Edwards from Rep. Solarz).
265. Using the plain meaning of words is a basic tool in statutory interpretation. SeeWILIAM
P. STATSKY, LEGISLATIVE ANALISis AND DRAFrING 75-76 (2d ed. 1984) (explaining plain meaning
rule); William N. Eskridge,Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42
SrAN. L. REv. 321, 34045 (1990) (providing overview of textualism and use of plain meaning
rule). Also, in recent years, the rise of "new textualism" in legislative interpretation has
increased the importance of a statute's words and text. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Nea
Textualism, 37 UCLA L REv. 621, 656 (1990) (discussing Court's recent tendency to rely on
statutory plain meaning).
266. WEBsTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1475 (1986).
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challenging zoning ordinances must show that a desire to build a
church or to be located in a certain area is required by religious
doctrine.
67
Additionally, RFRA should explicitly prohibit the courts from
weighing the centrality of the asserted belief. As mentioned earlier,
this inquiry has posed problems for free exercise claimants who are
burdened by zoning ordinances." Although this task may be better
suited for the judicial branch than for Congress, recent Supreme
Court decisions have suggested that an inquiry into the centrality of
religious beliefs is improper.269 Therefore, RFRA should codify this
proposition as a matter of public policy, thereby providing an across-
the-board prohibition against inquiring into the centrality of beliefs
for RFRA claims.
Admittedly, these changes may increase the possibility that RFRA
will provide protection for fraudulent claims.2 7° In order to curb
these possible abuses, RFRA could require individuals to demonstrate
a "good faith claim" that the conduct is motivated by religious be-
lief.271 In essence, this threshold is somewhat similar to the "sinceri-
ty" inquiry of Yoder 272 but avoids examining any particular religious
tenet or belief.273  In determining whether a RFRA claimant meets
the "good faith" requirement, courts should determine whether an
ulterior motive exists that suggests the presence of bad faith. This
267. See supra text accompanying notes 163-74 (noting examples where free exercise
claimants challenging land use regulations and seeking exemptions from zoning ordinances were
denied permits due to failure to meet "exercise of religion" threshold).
268. See supra Part IIA (describing difficulty faced by free exercise claimants challenging
zoning ordinances).
269. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) ("What principle of law or logic
can be brought to bear to contradict a believer's assertion that a particular act is 'central' to his
personal faith?"); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) ("It is not within the
judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity
of particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds."); see also Austin, supra note 73, at 30-31
(observing that decisions in Smith and Hernandez appear to foreclose judicial inquiry into
centrality of practices or beliefs).
270. Throughout the debate over RFRA, many lawmakers feared that the Act would offer
protection for fraudulent claims, especially those brought by prisoners. See 139 CONG. REC.
S14,353 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Reid) (offering amendment to exclude
prisoner claims from RFRA); SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892,
(stating additional views of Senator Simpson's concern over RFRA's applicability to prisoner
claims).
271. See Godshall, supra note 134, at 1577 (recommending that courts postpone centrality
analysis and require "only good faith claim that a burdened practice is religious"). This
Comment uses Godshall's suggestion and incorporates the "good faith claim" threshold as a
proposed solution to RFRA's shortcomings.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 72-75 (explaining that Yodersincerity inquiry sought
to separate philosophical and personal beliefs and secular values from expressions of religious
beliefs).
273. Cf. Austin, supra note 73, at 34 (arguing that "sincerity is unrelated to the question
whether belief is religious").
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requirement may help identify zoning disputes that are "masquerad-
ing" as free exercise claims.2 74 Although a judge or jury would still
need to make this determination, the good faith threshold should
avoid the need to dissect an individual's religious beliefs.
B. "Substantial Burden"
Because Congress instructed the courts to examine pre-Smith case
law to determine whether governmental action substantially burdens
religion,27 religious organizations and individuals who challenge
zoning ordinances may still find it difficult to meet this threshold."7
Although Congress did not draft RFRA to favor one type of free
exercise claim over another,277 many commentators have criticized
the courts' recent trend of adopting an overly restrictive view of what
constitutes a substantial burden, thereby narrowing the scope of
protection for all free exercise claims.27 As one scholar argues, a
narrow interpretation of substantial burden would "undermine the
effect of the statute."279  Therefore, RFRA's deference to pre-Smith
case law does not provide a workable guide to protect religious
freedom.
To strike a more sensible balance between religious liberty and
competing governmental interests,2" RFRA should explicitly state
that "government activity need not coerce individuals into violating
their religious beliefs nor penalize religious activity by denying any
person an equal share of the rights, benefits or privileges enjoyed by
any citizen in order to constitute a substantial burden." Indeed, most
of this language is borrowed from the House report.28 1  The pro-
274. See Germantown Seventh Day Adventist Church v. City of Philadelphia, No. 94-1633,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12163, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1994) (characterizing zoning disputes as
"masquerading as a civil rights action"), aft'd, No. 94-1889, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 11776 (3d Cir.
Apr. 9, 1995).
275. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text (discussing SenateJudiciary Committee's
suggestion that pre-Smith case law be considered in determining whether "substantial burden"
test is met).
276. See supra text accompanying notes 182-94 (illustrating difficulties inherent in meeting
substantial burden requirement).
277. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 7 (stating that RFRA's enactment was not intended
to approve or disapprove results in any particular free exercise case); SENATE REPORT, supra note
10, at 9, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.CAN. 1892, 1898 (stating that RFRA does not codify results of
any prior free exercise case); see also Laycock, Religious Freedom, supra note 43, at 235 (arguing
that RFRA does not offer special advantages or disadvantages for certain claims).
278. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (demonstrating constriction of substantial
burden test with reference to Lyng decision).
279. Berg, supra note 15, at 51.
280. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (5) (Supp. V 1993) (advocating approach of prior cases which
strike "sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests").
281. The relevant portion of the House Report reads:
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posed change, however, would clarify the House report's text by
including the word "substantial burden" and incorporating this text
into the statutory language of RFRA. These changes would resolve
ambiguities within the legislative history by mandating that courts
adopt a broad reading of substantial burden for RFRA claims.
CONCLUSION
In the context of zoning regulations that burden religious liberties,
many commentators believe that the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993 restores the scope of religious protection that had been
damaged by Smith. Upon closer examination, however, it appears that
the damage existed long before the Smith decision. Although
Congress, by passing RFRA, reinstated the compelling interest test,
this test is just one of many parts needed to restore religious freedom
to the heydays of the Free Exercise Clause. Because the Act does not
adequately address the threshold problems faced by those burdened
by zoning ordinances, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act may not
be able to stop the shrinking zone of religious protection.
All governmental actions which have a substantial external impact on the practice of
religion would be subject to the restrictions in this bill. In this regard, in order to
violate the statute, government activity need not coerce individuals into violating their
religious beliefs nor penalize religious activity by denying any person an equal share
of the rights, benefits and privileges enjoyed by any citizen. Rather, the test applies
whenever a law or an action taken by the government to implement a law burdens a
person's exercise of religion.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 6. This language, however, is not contained in the
corresponding Senate Report. Regarding the substantial burden requirement of RFRA, the
Senate Report states:
Pre-Smith case law makes it clear that only governmental actions that place a substantial
burden on the exercise of religion must meet the compelling interest test as set forth
in the act. The act thus would not require such ajustification for every government
action that may have some incidental effect on religious institutions.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 9, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898.
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